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Audit quality has become an important aspect in recent year. A reliable audit report will be a very 
useful information for various parties in order to provide assurance that the financial statements 
presented in accordance with applied accounting standards. The purpose of this study is to investigate 
the effects of managerial ownership, institutional ownership and company size on audit quality. At 
the same time this study also to investigate the effect of managerial ownership and institutional 
ownership on company size. Audit quality proxied by going-concern audit opinion. The research 
used partial least square/ variance based statistical method, with descriptive analitical research 
method. The research found that the value of  r square for company size was 0.125 (weak) and the 
value of r square for audit quality was 0.073 (weak). With a significant level = 5%, it was found that  
company size has a significant effect on audit quality, institutional ownership did not have a 
significant effect on audit quality, managerial ownership did not have significant effect on audit 
quality, institutional ownership did not have a significant effect on company size and managerial 
ownership did not have a significant effect on company size.  
  




he first crisis faced by Indonesia which 
was a legacy of the old order in which the 
economic conditions were very severe, 
most of the production halted and the economic 
growth during the 19621966 period was less 
than 2%  which resulted in a decrease in per 
capita income. The second crisis was the high 
inflation in the 1970s, it was because the amount 
of money in circulation and the end of the food 
crisis in 1972. The inflation rate peaked at 41% 
in 1974, also devalued rupiah by 50% in 1978. 
Furthermore, in September 1984 Indonesia 
experienced a banking crisis, which originated 
from banking deregulation in 1983 that forced 
the state banks to mobilize their funds and bear 
the risk of bad debts, and was free to determine 
the interest rate, so lasted until the economic 
crisis that began in 1997. Again  between the 
years 1990-1995 Indonesian economy several 
times crashed from time to time until 1998 
Indonesia experienced a very serious economic 
crisis until the economy damaged the joints of 
economics (Tambunan, 1998). The definition of 
during relatively stable economic condition in 
Indonesia at this study were in the era after the 
economic crisis of 1998, so that the data 
processed in this study was taken for the year of 
2001 to 2012.  
The relationship between the principals 
as the owner and managers as agent (referred to 
as an agency relationship) is seen as a very 
important relationship to the company, namely 
as a contract from the principal parties to the 
agent who carry out a service or work for the 
interests of the principal and for that reason the 
principal delegates some authority to the agent 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). The Efforts made 
by the principal in order to perform the functions 
of management as agent in accordance with the 
interests of the owners is to put a good 
controlling system, including a system of 
reporting is in accordance with the applicable 
reporting standards, and finally where the 
appointed auditors in the assignment of the audit 
will give the qualified audit results.  
The collapse of Enron, which had 
involved the big five public accounting firms, 
Arthur Andersen and also the downfall of 
WorldCom in the United States, have been 
Attributed to poor audit quality associated with 
T 
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a perceived lack of auditor independence 
(Nurhayati, 2002). Reviews These were alleged 
as audit failures deemed to have occurred 
Because auditors either failed to detect or report 
material errors/ misstatements in the financial 
statements.  
Managerial ownership freely interpreted 
as the conditions where shares that is owned by 
the managers and or the directors of an entity in 
itself. Managerial ownership can bring together 
the interests of managers with shareholders so 
that works out to be a mechanism that can reduce 
agency problems between managers and the 
owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It is based 
on the idea that an increase in the proportion of 
shares owned by the manager will reduce the 
tendency of managers to perform redundant 
actions in the interests of the manager alone. 
When the proportion of managerial ownership is 
high enough then the managers will feel 
involved have companies that will try to reduce 
actions that could hurt the company. Thus it will 
unite the interests of managers with 
shareholders, this condition will give positive 
impact on the performance of the company and 
support the viability of the company, The 
supervisors and also including the  audit 
committee will look for a qualified auditor that 
causing a tendency to produce quality audit 
reports for the company.  
Institutional ownership is the percentage 
of voting rights held by institutions (Beiner et 
al., 2006; Alipour 2013). With the existence of 
institutional ownership as by external parties 
owners such as insurance companies, banks, 
investment companies, and ownership by other 
institutions can encourage closer performance 
control to the company management, conducted 
surveillance efforts including the selection of 
credible and competent auditors that it will 
produce a higher quality audit report.  
It is the reason the institutional 
ownership of equity has grown rapidly in recent 
years. As it says there is an increasing power of 
institutional investors in the market and their 
influence over corporate policies. The 
institutions usually hold blocks of securities and 
continuously monitor corporate management 
(Nussboun & Dobrzynski 1987).  
On the other hand that the large-sized 
companies are more likely to have the ability to 
overcome the problems they face when 
compared with small company, big companies 
who facing financial problems will be easier to 
seek funding, as investor confidence to those 
larger than the small ones, because according to 
the investors, the larger companies more capable 
to manage its money properly. The above 
considerations also give to the auditors to take 
more attention to the smaller companies than in 
large-sized enterprises in the granting of going 
concern audit opinion, thus the quality of the 
audit (in this study diproxied by going concern 
audit opinion) more visible in small companies 
(Stocken 2000; Mutchler  1986; Fijriantoro 
2010). in this case it can be said that the size of 
the company deal (have correlation) with the 
results given the auditor's audit quality.  
This study aims to find out the influence 
of ownership, company size on audit quality in 
Indonesian banking industry. Yet to enrich the 
results, this study also try to find out the effect 
of ownership on the company size in Indonesian 
banking industry by taking the time span of the 
data in relatively stable economic situation (the 
study year 2001-2012). To limit the coverage, 
this research estimates audit quality by using 
measures from inside audit firms which is the 
issue of going-concern opinion as Jackson et al., 
(2008) applied, also because of the quality of the 
audit results is determined by the outcomes of a 
report/ opinion of the auditor itself.  
  
Research Questions  
  Based on the above descriptions and 
background, then the research questions for 
this study are:   1. Is there any 
significant effect of company size on audit 
quality in Indonesia banking industry?  
2. Is there any significant effect of 
institusional ownership on audit quality 
in Indonesia banking industry?  
3. Is there any significant effect of 
managerial ownership on audit quality 
in Indonesia banking industry?  
4. Is there any significant effect of 
institusional ownership on company 
size in Indonesia banking industry?  
5. Is there any significant effect of 
managerial ownership on company size 
in Indonesia banking industry?  
  
Method of Study, Data and Originality  
This research is a descriptive study, in 
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which the author describes the object under 
study in accordance with the actual situation 
without treatment and intervention with the 
object of  study, this research uses statistics as a 
tool in order to assist in taking conclusion,  it is 
using partial least square regression approach 
(PLS) path analysis gives more openness in 
providing data processing requirements in the 
sense that the terms classical assumptions and 
certain distributions as ordinary least squares 
approach is no longer needed (Latan and Ghozali 
2012, Jogianto 2009).  
PLS regression seeking for component 
of the better predictors for the object, under 
study with PLS regression it will be more easier 
terms in the number of independent variables, 
that is to say if the number of independent 
variables > the number of observations than the 
degree of freedom will be negative so that 
ordinary least squared (OLS regression) cannot 
resolve the equation, but with PLS this can be 
resolved (Ghozali 2013), Another advantage of 
the PLS approach is that this approach can still 
be used in the data with a small sample but it 
gives good results. Thus the outcomes of the 
study will provide useful results and practical 
objectives. It says further that using partial least 
square approach was not much hinted before 
processing the data (eg requirements in classical 
assuming) as usual when the covariance 
approach based / ordinary least square but still 
can find the powerful results (Wold, 1985), so 
the results of this processing will provide the 
answers to the effect of ownership and company 
size on audit quality during the economic stable 
in Indonesia.  
The study population is the entire 
banking companies listed on the Stock Exchange 
that the research study sample was banking 
companies published audited financial 
statements by an independent auditor for the 
period ending 31 December 2001 to 2012, both 
of which give a going concern audit opinion or 
not giving going concern audit opinion by an 
independent auditor. Secondary data were 
obtained from the official website of the Stock 
Exchange that is www.idx.co.id and 
www.sahamok.com in the form of annual report 
and the audited financial statements banking 
companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange.  
The models in this study based on 
previous theories builded and it is unique in 
terms of the writer did not find yet the study 
specified the audit quality during the economic 
stable in Indonesia and at the same time using 
partial least squred path analysis.  
  
Basic of Theory  
 Audit quality firstly defined as the joint 
probability that auditors will discover and report 
a breach in their clients’ accounting system 
(DeAngelo 1981). No single agreed definition of 
audit quality serves as a standard. Researchers 
established several proxy variables for testing, 
including Leonora at al.,  
(2012:3-4) using fraudulent financial reports as 
proxy for audit quality. While research of Myers 
et al., (2003) using tenur public accounting firms 
and audit partners as a proxy for audit quality. 
Jackson et al., (2008) proxied audit quality 
propensity to issue a going-concern report and 
the level of discretionary accruals. While Siregar 
at al., (2012) and also Lawrence et al., (2011) 
using discretionary accruals in research to 
measure the quality of the audit, Rustiarini 
(2012:11) in his research proxied audit quality 
with smooth accrual. Zunaidah at al., (2013) 
using the amount of audit fees paid as a 
measurement of audit quality, while Simunic 
and Stein (1996) and also DeFond (1992) using 
auditors size as the size of audit quality. While 
Palmrose, (1988) and also Heninger, (2001) 
using the auditor litigation as a measure of audit 
quality. Simunic and Stein (1996) and also 
DeFond (1992) using the auditor size as a 
measure of audit quality. Different again with 
Palmrose, (1988) and also Heninger, (2001) 
using the auditor litigation as a measure of audit 
quality. This study estimate audit quality by 
using measures from audit firms inside the 
which is the issue of going-concern opinion as 
Jackson et al., (2008) applied.  
  
Company Size and Audit Quality  
 
The size of the company is a scale that can 
classify companies into large and small 
companies in a variety of ways, including total 
assets, the value of the stock market, the average 
level of sales, and sales amount. Basically the 
only firm size is divided into large enterprises, 
medium and small companies.  
At the time of the company face financial 
problems in funding, then the alternatives to do 
is through loans from outside parties or issuing 
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shares for the financing. Large companies are 
more likely to have the ability to overcome 
problems like these, large companies easier to 
seek funding for a more credible, Investors also 
found larger companies have more ability to 
manage their money properly.  
On the other hand, auditors also view that the 
small company should receive more attention in 
connection with the provision of audit opinion 
going concern, thus the quality of the audit 
(which proxied with goingconcern audit 
opinion) more clearly have the relationship with 
the size of the company (Stocken 2000; 
Mutchler  1986; Fijriantoro 2010; Arsianto & 
Rahardjo 2013), in this case it can be said that 
the size of the company will deal with the results 
of audit quality given by the auditor.  
  
Ownership and Audit Quality  
 
Managerial ownership in a general sense are 
shares owned by the managers and or the 
directors of an entity itself, such ownership can 
bring together the interests of managers with 
shareholders so that works out to be a 
mechanism that can reduce agency problems 
between managers and the owners (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). At the time of managerial 
ownership is high then the managers of the 
company will perform its functions better, with 
better coordination with other functions 
including the audit committee and the appointed 
auditors so that it will provide a better audit 
process in generating output of audit quality. In 
a study conducted in British insurance 
companies found that there are significant 
proportions of non-executives’ directors (which 
is seen as an independent condition) on the 
quality of the audit result while it also found that 
there was no correlation between managerial 
ownership on the quality of the audit result, 
namely ownership by members of the board and 
CEO of the company with the quality of the audit 
results (O'Sullivan and Diacon, 2003). Another 
view also found that managerial ownership can 
reduce the agency conflict between managers 
and shareholders, managers will feel a company 
so the existence of the company will be retained 
and the company's development will be done by 
increasing corporate control. Thus, the greater 
the proportion of managerial ownership, the 
smaller the possibility of receiving a going 
concern audit opinion. Linoputri (2010) shows 
the great influence of managerial ownership of 
the possibility of going concern audit opinion by 
the auditor in the company, the greater the 
managerial ownership, the less likely the auditor 
provides going concern audit opinion on the 
company.  
Further research found that manager owners 
have an incentive to reduce associated agency 
costs by providing high audit quality. A high 
audit quality should thus be increasing as 
managerial ownership decreases.  A related 
agency problem is that of entrenchment whereby 
managers, by virtue of their increased voting 
power, have increasing power to shirk and 
procure perquisites at shareholders' expense. 
The associated increasing agency risk implies 
that, when the risk of entrenchment decreases, 
the need, and thus provision, of high audit 
quality should also decrease. Based on these 
arguments, and following prior empirical 
research, posited and found that at low and high 
levels of managerial ownership (below 5% and 
above 25%), where entrenchment is not 
increasing, audit quality is decreasing in 
managerial ownership.  At intermediate levels, 
where entrenchment arguably does increase, it is 
unclear which effect (divergence of interests or 
entrenchment) dominates (Kane and Velury 
2005).  
Institutional ownership is the percentage of 
voting rights held by institutions (Beiner et al., 
2006; Alipour 2013). With the existence of 
institutional ownership as ownership by external 
parties such as insurance companies, banks, 
investment companies, and ownership by other 
institutions can encourage closer scrutiny.  
At a high level of institutional ownership will 
improve the efficiency of the use of corporate 
assets, creating the optimal supervision of 
management performance, helping management 
carry out its responsibilities in accordance with 
the expected investor or better than expected, 
because of stock ownership represents an 
authority that could be used to support or vice 
versa on the performance of the management, 
the management of the company that made more 
professional, the control system will tend to be 
better prepared and audit committees that are 
less tied to the company or are seen as more 
independent will tend to be more awakened 
(Dorothy and David, 2003). This situation will 
lead to the selection of an independent auditor 
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more and more competent in engagement and 
assignment so that the tendency of producing 
output that is more reliable audit opinion and the 
quality will be higher.  
  
Ownership and Size  
  
As has already been mentioned that the size of 
the company as a scale that can classify 
companies into large and small companies in a 
variety of ways including total assets, the value 
of the stock market, the average level of sales, 
and total sales. The company's growth also 
indicates the company's ability to maintain its 
business continuity. The companies that grow 
show activities in the company's operations go 
according to plans made, so that the companies 
can maintain its economic position and survival, 
while companies with a negative growth 
indicates a greater tendency toward bankruptcy 
(Altman in Widyantari 2011), companies with 
good and sustainable growth will increasing the 
size of the various scales of measurement.  
Ownership structure could be considered to be 
one of the factor that can determine the 
performance of companies and further to the 
growth and size of the company. With the 
difference of company ownership means the 
management and regulation in the determination 
of the company can also be different. With the 
presence of management as representatives of 
business owners in running the business will 
provide opportunities for management itself acts 
and using methods as an alternative that will 
provide benefit for him as an agent and not 
solely for the benefit of owners, this 
opportunistic situation can be minimized by 
effective monitoring (Herawaty, 2008). One 
way to become better monitoring function is to 
consider an appropriate ownership structure, 
because the ownership structure will able to 
influence investment decisions and that further 
efforts will have an impact growth (Haruman, 
2006), with adequate growth will impact on the 
size for the company itself.  
  
Hypothesis  
From the above descriptions, the 
hypothesis of this study constructed as 
follows:  
1. Company size has a significant effect on 
audit quality in Indonesia banking 
industry.  
2. Institusional ownership has a significant 
effect on audit quality in Indonesia 
banking industry.  
3. Managerial ownership has a significant 
effect on audit quality in Indonesia 
banking industry.  
4. Institusional ownership has a significant 
effect on company size in Indonesia 
banking industry.  
5. Managerial ownership has a significant 
effect on company size in Indonesia 
banking industry.  
  
 The Analysis  
 The analysis of this study includes descriptive 
statistic and statistical hypothesis testing in order 
to be able to answer the hypothesis that has been 
proposed.  
  
Descriptive Statistics  
There were 38 banking companies listed in the 
Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) in the period 
20012012, there were 6 delisted banks taken out 
as research sample, also 17 other banks taken out 
as reseacrh sample it was because these banks 
were new entry in JSX listing at the time of 
observation period, so there were 15 banks taken 
as sample in this study. With the years of 
research 2001 up to 2012 then there were 180 
years observational datas. The statistical 
descriptive results shown the mean of audit 
quality was low, namely that from all 
observation yearlong there was only 5% of the 
audit results with going concern opinion. Shares 
that held by managerials only 3.29%, while 
institutional ownership of 70.89%, Such 
ownership may impact on the ability to monitor 
management as agent in carrying out a better 
responsibilities. while the rest of the bank shares 
ownership were on the other third parties. For 
the size of the company indicated that the mean 
value of total assets for the object under this 
study was 21.389.986 (million rupiahs), with a 
minimum value of 274.989 (million rupiahs) and 
a maximum value of 440.970.898 (million 
rupiahs), which indicated there was a very large 
variability for bank size (see table 1).  
   





  N Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std. Deviation  
Audit Quality  180 0  1  .05  .219  
11.9515354  Managerial Ownership  180 .0000  55.8000  3.292989  
Institusional Ownership  
Company Size (million Rups)  















    
  Sumber : statistical output with spss v.20  
  
Outer Model Test (Measurement Model)  
The above figure 1 and Table 2 below answered 
whether datas used in this study feasible to be  
proceeded to the next stage.  
  
Figure 1  
Outer Model Test  
  
    Source: PLS figure output  
  
From the above figure found that the entire 
loading factors was > 0.7  which mean it has a 
qualified validity and with the value of average 
variance extracted and Cronbachs Alpha were > 
0.5 (see also table below), which means that the 
model was eligible to be processed further for 





   AVE  Composite Reliability  R Square  Cronbachs Alpha  
Audit Quality  1.000000  1.000000  0.073413  1.000000  
Company Size  1.000000  1.000000  0.125244  1.000000  
Institusional Ownership  1.000000  1.000000     1.000000  
Managerial Ownership  1.000000  1.000000     1.000000  
    Source: statistical PLS output  
  
Inner Model Test (Path Model)  
After going through the outer models test and 
shown that the datas were qualified and valid 
then the correlational testing among variables 
can be proceeded and at this stage of hypothesis 
testing can also be done. This hypothesis testing 
using significance level (α) of 5% and based on 
the rule of thumb inner evaluation models that 
the correlational between variables will be 
declared significant if the t-statistics > 1.96 
(Latan and Ghozali 2012). Path testing models 
with PLS approach resulted that only two 
hypotheses were accepted, namely:  
1. Hypothesis 1: which is, there is a 
significant effect of Company size on 
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audit quality in Indonesia banking 
industry.  
2. Hypothesis 5: which is, there is a 
significant effect of managerial 
ownership on company size in 
Indonesia banking industry.  
  
Managerial ownership will minimize agency 
conflict in company so that the supervisory and 
controlling functions would more effectively 
applied, companies with a good supervisory 
function would be able to improve its 
performance and impact both on the growth and 
size of its company. Companies with a relatively 
larger size have a smaller tendency to get the 
results of going-concern audit opinion because 
auditors consider that the large company have a 
better ability to overcome the problems 
(including financial issues) that they faced.  
  
  
Figure 2  
Inner Model Test  
 
 




Path Coefficients (Mean, STDEV, T-Values) 
   
Original 
Sample (O)  
Sample 












Company Size -> Audit Quality  -0.277554  -0.252466  0.133616  0.133616  2.077250  Accepted  
Institusional Ownership -> Audit Quality  -0.060969  -0.078526  0.190733  0.190733  0.319655  Rejected  
Institusional Ownership -> Company Size  0.002417  0.018183  0.169301  0.169301  0.014279  Rejected  
Managerial Ownership -> Audit Quality  -0.203485  -0.199998  0.132694  0.132694  1.533492  Rejected  
Managerial Ownership -> Company Size  -0.352234  -0.333694  0.136989  0.136989  2.571265  Accepted  
  Source: statistical PLS output  
  
  
Conclusion and Management Interpretation  
 
From 15 banks as research sample in this study 
there were 180 year datas observation, statistical 
result showed a mean value of audit quality that 
was proxied by going-concern opinion was 5% 
or at low level, This shown that in the stable 
economics condition going concern audit 
opinion issue would not became an attractive to 
the auditor's attention, This research support 
research conducted by Nolan which stating that 
the issues going concern audit opinion increased 
under crisis economic situation (Nolan: 2009).  
Although banking business sustainability can 
not be considered equal or in one uniformity 
between one bank to another bank particularly 
the data shown that the bank size variability in 
Indonesia was very large, it was the minimum 
value of 274.989 (million rupiahs) and a 
maximum value of 440.970.898 (millions 
rupiahs).  
From statistical test concluded that there was 
significant effect of managerial ownership on 
company size in Indonesia banking industry. 
Such managerial ownership would mitigate the 
agency conflicts so that the company 
supervisory function more effectively carried, 
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the nature or opportunistic manner of managers 
would reduced because managers as at the time 
also as the owners so that they would function 
them self to optimized company results and 
achievements, those managers would carry out 
managerial functions properly and thus those 
circumstance impacted for increasing both to the 
growth and the size of the company (this is in 
line with findings of Haruman 2006). Further 
finding that there was significant effect of 
company size on audit quality in Indonesia 
banking industry (agreed with Mutchler  dalam  
Fijriantoro 2010; Arsianto & Rahardjo 2013). 
Which implies that the presence of managerial 
ownership in Indonesia bank have affected the 
increasing in the size of the bank and the bank's 
size also has affected the provision of banking 
going concern audit opinion, so that managerial 
ownership required as an important attention in 
Indonesia banking companies.  
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